

## **Exploration of the Pros and Cons of Pakistan's Engagement in US-Sponsored Military Alliances**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The objectives of this paper is to analyze the determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy strategy during the Cold War. The role of the U.S. in Pakistan's foreign policy throughout the Cold War, the 'war against the USSR' in Afghanistan – regarded as the first test case for Pakistan during the Cold war as a frontline ally of the U.S - and, currently, the fight against terrorism should not be understated. From Pakistanis' leader's standpoint, what were the country's geopolitical options and bargaining tools during that period? The study will follow the critical qualitative approach toward the SEATO & CENTO, its background, US approach toward Pakistan During cold war period. This article does not reject structural realists' analyses of South Asian geopolitics; rather, we take it as a point of departure to explore the mechanisms and processes that have shaped Pakistan's international behavior by following a historical approach based on both Western and Pakistani sources.

**Keywords:** CENTO, Communism, MDA, Pak-US Relations, SEATO

### **Introduction**

Nevertheless, Pakistan-U.S. relations have been described as 'a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken promises, and disastrous misunderstandings. The love-hate relationship has seen attempts to create rapport and periods of economic and military collaboration marked by conflict and distrust. As stated by Haqqani, U.S. and Pakistani motives for forming an alliance differ. Therefore, Pakistan has been disappointed that the U.S. does not share its fears of Indian hegemony on the subcontinent, while Washington has expected Pakistan to fight Communism and terrorism rather than divert economic and military aid to India's hard power capabilities. ( Haqqani, 2013)

After the World War II, the US confronted with the formidable threat of Soviet communism and designed a global strategy to deter its expansion. During this period, Soviet communism was the dominant factor in formulation of American policy towards other states. This brought additional tension between the Soviet Union and the US. Both countries felt a higher degree of insecurity and both regarded one another as potential adversaries threatening territorial integrity and political independence. A bipolarization of the world led to a lengthy Cold War. The American policymaker always prefer India due to its size. The US viewed India as a significant contribution to its bloc against the Soviet Union. Despite a desire for friendly relations, India was not ready to be part of the American policy of Soviet containment. After failing to get support from India, the US offered Pakistan for alliance partnership and Pakistan gladly accepted it. From the very beginning, the American attitude was based on defeating the communist expansion.

Although Pakistan was little known to America yet the US was one of the first countries to recognize it as a new nation. This was announced by the American press during the visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950. A few months later, US Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the geostrategic importance of Pakistan. They viewed Karachi and Lahore as vital bases to launch air operation against the Soviet Union.

### **Literature Review**

A substantial body of literature exists concerning the Pak-US Relations especially in Cold war period, but there is a noticeable dearth of information dedicated to the cause behind the Pak-US Millet

alliance during the cold war period. However, there has been limited exploration of the contributions made by other scholars. This study seeks to address this research gap by delving into cause and its impacts of Alliance during the specific period.

### **Methodology:**

This study utilizes an anthropological method that highlights both careful observation and direct involvement. The study will follow the critical qualitative approach toward the SEATO & CENTO, its background, US approach toward Pakistan During cold war period.

### **Is Pakistan had no Choice but Western Block?**

A nation's phase changes after independence. However, the events leading up to independence and the early aftermath have a major impact on a nation's future, including Pakistan. The Congress Party claimed to represent all of undivided India, but Pakistan's independence was the climax of Muslim nationhood. The main reasons for joining the western block were.

- The Congress fiercely opposed the demand for Pakistan. This caused distrust and antagonism between the Congress and Muslim League.
- Pre-independence hostility became distrust between India and Pakistan, and the Indian leadership thought Pakistan should not have happened. After the Radcliffe Award gave some Muslim-majority areas to India and the nascent state of Pakistan had legacy issues, relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated.
- The influx of refugees, communal riots, the dispute over the division of the former Indian Army and Indian Government assets, minorities, the canal water dispute, the evacuee property question, and the concentration of Indian troops on the Punjab border in 1947-51 were complex issues. India depreciated its currency in 1949, and when Pakistan refused, India stopped trading with it, causing a financial crisis in Pakistan. (Rizvi, 2000)
- The Congress Committee accepted the June 3, 1947 Partition Plan, saying, \*When current passions calm, India's issues will be understood in their true perspective and the fallacious notion of two nations in India would be discredited. Such statements resonated throughout India after Pakistan was founded. In a November 1950 address, Sardar Patel observed, "India and Pakistan may be rejoined after realizing the immense suffering division caused them. (Khan L. , 2001)
- Indian invasion in Goa, Pakistan faces the same sane risk that Goa faced, and India will try to wipe off Pakistan as soon as she feels strong enough since Indians still consider Pakistani territory part of Akhand Bharat.
- Pakistan's internal politics and foreign relations were shaped by fear of Indian dominance. Whether this concern was legitimate was another matter, but India did help Pakistan organize when she needed it. Pakistan was alarmed by the takeover of Kashmir because to its strategic importance. Kashmir can economically and militarily damage Pakistan due to its strategic location. Two major rivers originate in Kashmir. Mangla Headworks on the Jhelum River lies a few miles inside Azad Kashmir. Indian troops in Kashmir might threaten the North West Frontier Province, Punjab, and Rawalpindi Islamabad from the rear. Thus, Kashmir can be utilized to attack Pakistan.
- Pakistani attack on India via Kashmir seems unlikely. Various places between Peshawar and Karachi are within 30 miles of Indian Kashmir and India. Pakistan's military efforts will suffer if this link is broken.
- Pakistan also inherited north-west boundaries and Pathan tribes. The Muslim state advantage gave Pakistan an early lead. This one element helped Pakistan pacify several Pathan tribes that fought the Indian Army before independence. When Nehru and the Khan Brothers visited Pathan tribes a few months before independence in 1947, their outlook changed. The reception was hostile, and his automobile was stoned. The border Province chose Pakistan in the referendum. The Pakistani government changed the British policy toward tribesmen and

removed all regular troops from tribal areas, handing responsibility over to local civil armed groups.

- Afghanistan became interested in the future of Pathans east of the Durand Line when it became evident that the British were leaving India. Since the new state of Pakistan would lack the resources of the British Government, the Afghan Government proposed creating an independent state that included all Pukhtoon and Pathan areas (the N.W.F. Province and parts of Baluchistan). In 1947, Afghan Prime Minister Hashim Khan said that if Pukhtunistan could not be independent, the Frontier province could join Afghanistan. What was interesting was that Afghan authorities did not discuss incorporating Pathan areas on their side of the Durand Line. Pakistan was constantly criticized for Pukhtunistan. The 1950 Jashan-i-Kabul saw the Afghan Air Force dump anti-Pakistan leaflets and raise Pukhtunistan flags.
- The demand for Pukhtunistan received support from Indian and Soviet authorities. Indian leaders supported Pukhtunistan after Pakistan was established because they knew the N.W.F. Province would join Pakistan.
- The Soviet Government supported Afghanistan on the Pukhtunistan matter due to Pakistan's membership in Western defense pacts. Radio Moscow supported Afghanistan. Afghanistan's only support in the Frontier Province was from the Red Shirts, Congress camp adherents who opposed Pakistan.
- The Pakistan Army and Air Force responded against Afghan-inspired tribesmen. Pakistan Withdrew transit privileges to Afghanistan twice in 25 years, breaking diplomatic relations. Afghanistan's 1955 protest against Pakistan's merger of the N.W.F. Province into West Pakistan's One Unit Scheme was the first diplomatic torture. After public protests in Afghanistan led to attacks on Pakistan's Embassy and Consulate in Kabul and Jalalabad, Pakistan blatantly interfered in her personal life. (Rizvi, 2000)

### **Pakistani and US reciprocal possibilities.**

The US improved Pakistan's defense and economic prospects. As U.S. backing of the Pakistan army enhanced its national stature, it also encouraged undemocratic tendencies in the country. The military dominated politics through a pro-Western alliance of conservatives, including Islamists. The US didn't mind Pakistan's religious image since it offered domestic stability and a shield against communism. U.S.-Pakistan ties were not built on common viewpoints, as became clear. The U.S. perspective that communism was expansionist, disruptive, and a threat to Pakistan was unsupported by Pakistan's experience. The US did not believe the Indian threat to Pakistan.

### **Mutual Security and Doctrine of Eisenhower:**

Eisenhower designated defense alliance proponent John Foster Dulles secretary of state on January 20, 1953, his first day in office. Dulles commented on his trip to Pakistan, emphasizing that the country's strategic position, huge Moslem population, and strong spiritual faith and warrior spirit made it a trustworthy bulwark against Communism. He also said Pakistan will provide troops, resources, and critical facilities to a Western defense effort.

The Eisenhower doctrine guided US policy following Korea. In 1953, Eisenhower announced "Massive Retaliation" and the "Northern Tier of Defence" was one of his first major policies. (Kux , 2001) The Eisenhower administration sought to bolster frontline states like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq's military to limit American involvement in operations like Korea. It aimed to help nations fight communism. Eisenhower negotiated assistance and security accords. Preventing communist attack was the priority. These links were crucial to US national security. MDA helps allied nations protect themselves in the free world ( Stebbins, 1954). Mutually beneficial, voluntary cooperation was stressed. The Eisenhower doctrine said that the US would go to war to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of oil-rich West Asia.. (Rao, 1985) The government considered Pakistan a possible ally in improving Muslim relations. Thus, the current administration favors Pakistan over India. In December 1953, US Vice President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan to strengthen relations. He stated, "In the future, the US would be happy to support Pakistan's industrial growth and security.

The Republican administration's 'New Look' regional defence alliance system. (Rao, 1985) Not only did they receive financial and political backing, but also military aid. Eisenhower promised not to use nuclear weapons for aggression. Dulles explained this concept, and circumstances led him to invent "massive retaliation". The US might establish a communications and surveillance base near Peshawar. Pakistan's underequipped military and ability to cope with India were boosted by \$17.5 million in military and \$60 million in economic aid from the US. Each country joined the security cooperation for various reasons, but all found it useful in the short term.

### **Pakistan's security concerns during the Cold War**

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Truman's Republican successor, thought a weapons partnership with Pakistan would be good. The Eisenhower administration spent eight years making Pakistan a South Asian hub against communism. It approved weaponry aid and started a CIA-Pakistan partnership that continues today. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary of state, knew South Asia. His grandfather, Presbyterian missionary John Welsh Dulles, lauded the Raj for its colonial rule in *Life in India*. In May 1953, John Foster Dulles, the first U.S. secretary of state to visit South Asia, was met with hostility due to his anti-communism. New Delhi also resisted his plans to form NATO-like regional coalitions in the Middle East and South Asia to constrain Russia and China. Karachi, however, greeted Dulles with excitement, seeking American military help and an alliance to counter India. As an Islamic state, Pakistan was pleased to join the anti-communist chorus; it rejected atheistic Marxism anyhow, but it had its own goals. India was its geopolitical priority, not China or Russia. Eisenhower was willing to ignore Pakistan's goal provided it supported the U.S. in the cold war. So began an alliance. Dulles returned to Washington praising Pakistan and denouncing India. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Pakistan would fight communists with "bare hands" and that its "lancers were 6 feet 2 inches" tall and rode "great big horses and were out of this world".

### **Visit of Ayub Khan fall of 1953:**

In October 1953, Army Chief of Staff Ayub Khan came in Washington with a shopping list and charm. The Eisenhower crew loved the Sand Hurst-trained general. After visiting South Asia in December 1953, Vice President Richard Nixon became a U.S.-Pakistan believer. The National Security Council heard, "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. People have less complexes than Indians." (Khan M. , 1967) John Foster Dulles left on a long Asian tour on 9 May 1953. He visited India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. From 23 to 24 May, he visited Pakistan to examine partnership possibilities. Dulles praised Pakistan and wished to strengthen its support for a CSO.

Premier Mohammad Ali Bogra, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan pledged loyalty to the anti-communist accord. They wanted to join the alliance and liberate global defense squad. Dulles met Nehru in India to discuss Indo-American ties and American development aid. Due to his non-alignment, Nehru refused to join any military alliance in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. After the meeting, Dulles observed, "One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which Pakistani leaders feel for the States. Their comprehension of the world crisis amazed me, and they will oppose communism as long as they can. Pakistan's good view of the US was aided before Dulles' visit. The US showed goodwill by expediting Pakistan's request for 1 million tons of wheat worth \$74 million. It was delivered quickly and free to Karachi. (Sattar, 2007:43) In 1954, arms assistance began. The Pakistanis demanded more than the Pentagon would sell or give, but the White House, notably the Vice President, insisted. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in 1955, two of the U.S. administration's new alliances. Pakistan became America's "most allied ally" and complete cold war partner by joining these organizations. After then, intelligence collaboration grew dramatically.

### **Defense Alliances Toward Economic and Military Assistance:**

As communist ideology grew in Southeast Asia and Socialist China rose, U.S. authorities wanted to control it. The US government took several attempts to combat the communist threat, which

was believed to affect a third of the world's population. Examples include the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, Four Points, and NATO. Under the concept of collective security, the US sought to arrange allied contributions to maximize their strengths. This also invited non-aligned Asian and Middle Eastern nations to join the alliance. To defeat communism, regional alliances were formed. United States promised to provide financial, military, and technological aid to allies. This also limited communist aggression without U.S. troops. The US defined its new international role. The Truman administration endorsed Britain's Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) initiative at the end of 1952 to boost its international status. Nehru in India and Nasser in Egypt opposed the idea. US Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Arthur W. Radford met with General Ayub Khan and Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in Pakistan in November 1952. The two countries forged a military partnership after these negotiations.. (Burke, 1975) The May 1953 Dulles traveled extensively across Asia, including India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, to explore alliances. When he visited Pakistan on May 23 and 24, Dulles praised its efforts and sought its support for a cooperative security treaty. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra reiterated the anti-communist pact. Ayub Khan said the US would intervene once the British left. Dulles admired Pakistan's military's professionalism, devotion, and spirit. The person wrote to the US capital, "The Soviet Union is visible from Pakistan's northern border, and Communist China borders Pakistan. (Khan M. , 1967) Pakistan is responsible for safeguarding the Khyber Pass, a historically significant pathway for invasions from the northern region into the subcontinent.

Additionally, Pakistan is geographically situated on the periphery of Iran and the Middle East. (Sattar, 2020) Dulles and Nehru discussed enhancing Indo-American relations and American development funding in India. Negotiations for a Middle East or Southeast Asian military bloc failed due to Nehru's non-alignment. Dulles noted after the conference, "The extraordinary and real friendship which the Pakistani leaders felt for the United States was one of my clearest impressions." Their global perspective pleased me, and I'm sure they'll resist communism as long as they have the resources. (Rajvir, 1985) Pakistan's positive view of the US is due to pre-Dulles help. Pakistan received favorable treatment from the US when it requested one million tons of wheat worth \$74 million to be processed fast. It came immediately and free at Karachi port. (Sattar, 2020) The New York Times reported a US-Pakistan military cooperation on November 21, 1952. The US fought communism in Asia on economic, political, and diplomatic grounds. It retaliated heavily against the Soviet Union for its nuclear threat. (The New York Times, 1952) Also, it helped free countries that had been colonized by the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe. As early as 1927, Nehru articulated the perspective that Russia's potential to pose a threat to India in the foreseeable future was negligible. Furthermore, he asserted that Russia did not possess a colonial history or exhibit characteristics of a colonial power. (Rao, 1985) Support for the US containment approach from India was important. India and Pakistan disagreed on almost everything. Indian policy contrasted with American strategy, and India would not fully support the US. This contrasts with Pakistan's pro-American policies, which have drawn it closer to military alliances against Soviet communism. Thus, the US saw "Pakistan as a reliable ally in the region of South Asia". Pakistan is the only South Asian and Muslim nation to join the 1950s US-led military alliances. Pakistan was concerned with receiving military and economic help from the US without alienating the Soviet Union and China.

### **Regional Alliances and Pakistan**

Pakistan's strategic position makes it a military force. Indian Ocean naval outposts also appealed to the US. Pakistan's influence reached the Middle East and Afro-Asia beyond South Asia. The US comprehended Pakistan's moderate nationalistic and anti-western posture and support for western programs. The situation in Pakistan was worse than in India. However, its US ties were greater. Western nations supported a northern-tier collective security concept as an extension of NATO. On March 17, 1956, the Economist published the Northern Tier Plan, which featured the US-Pakistan-Turkey pact. Dulles mentioned northern tier countries Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. The US National strategic Council approved a strategic alliance in July 1953. Pakistan's defense agreements with Turkey and the US are the first steps toward a 'northern tier.' Ayub Khan sought to persuade President Eisenhower to form mutually beneficial collective security ties with the US in 1953. When pressed for reassurance, Ayub said, "Pakistan would support you if you support Pakistan." (Kux , 2001) Ghulam

Mohammad also visited the US in November 1953, but neither leader was able to persuade the government to help, perhaps out of concern of alienating India. After Vice President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan in December 1953, President Eisenhower approved military aid. Before making this statement, Eisenhower offered India a similar arrangement, but India rejected to join any coalition. (Sattar, 2020) However, due to American interests in the Middle East, Pakistan was brought into the northern defence tier. (Rajvir, 1985) The US began giving clandestine subsidies, military weapons sales, commercial loans, and foreign university tuition at this time. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara observed, "It is beyond price to make friends of such men." The US provided \$ 650 million in subsidies, \$619 million in military support, and \$55 million in cash and commercial loans between 1954 and 1965. The armaments market boomed between 1954 and 1961. (Husain & Rose, 1987) Pakistan, a buffer state between the Soviet Union and China, was meant to gain from military aid to enhance its defenses. American military aid sought global stability, while economic aid sought to improve living standards. Despite their diverse socioeconomic frameworks, 57 nations received aid by March 2, 1955. Pakistan received military help to boost national and regional security. Pakistan's willingness to trade air bases for military equipment was exposed in The New York Times' first public description of the US-Pak alliance on November 2, 1953. After India's reaction, President Eisenhower told a news conference that the US would avoid doing anything in Pakistan that may upset India. All of this suggests the US never wanted to antagonize India. However, India exploited this to hold a Kashmir referendum. The Indian politician warned parliament that American aid to Pakistan will damage Kashmir. (Rao, 1985)

### **South East Asian Treaty Organization SEATO**


After the French lost Indochina in 1954, some wanted to defend Southeast Asia from communism. In addition to fighting communism, the Eisenhower administration improved the region's political, economic, and military position. Collective security was created under alliance-based foreign strategy. In September 1954, eight Southeast Asian republics met in Manila to form a peace alliance. Pakistan ratified the South East Asia defense treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, since East Pakistan was there. The pact sought peace and trade. Pakistan joins the treaty because it opposes aggression. (Rajvir, 1985) US action was only in response to communist hostility. Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan opposed the accord at the Manila Conference, saying it should go beyond communist aggression. Pakistan threatened to leave the pact if the US would not apply it to the India-Pakistan issue. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali claimed Pakistan joined SEATO to resolve its dispute with India. India considered Pakistan's participation in the treaty unnecessary as East Pakistan was never threatened by international or Chinese communism. Washington refused to assist Pakistan fight India because it didn't want to support it. (Pasha, 1995) In contrast to its obligations to NATO partners, the United States does not consider an assault on Pakistan to be an attack on the United States. The pleadings of Pakistan were disregarded. (Rao, 1985) Pakistan desired protection from all assaults, including "communist," but the US valued that distinction. President Eisenhower wrote to India to reassure them of U.S. intentions. However, the American press and many saw Nehru's refusal to support Pakistan as a blunder. Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador to India, warned John Foster Dulles against arming Pakistan before SEATO's December 1953 ratification. Bowles worried that such arsenal may be used against India, worsening Middle East and Asian instability. He stressed the importance of open contact with India, but Washington ignored him. (Pasha, 1995) Dulles stated emphatically that talks to offer military aid to Pakistan were already beginning. Pakistan believed that working with the United States will improve the country's security and economy. (Rajvir, 1985) Later, politicians began to defer less to India because they thought Indian worries were overstated. India was concerned that arming Pakistan would lead to a race to the bottom rather than deterring the Soviet Union. Political fanatics and communists in Pakistan opposed US aid. Due to the Kashmir dispute, most Pakistanis blamed Nehru for moving their country closer to the West. Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali said his country wanted to maintain its security without using force. Pakistan prioritized insurance against India for security grounds. Despite India's distinct viewpoint on international affairs, the US declined.

In May 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US, becoming a Western ally. Pakistan eventually joined SATO. The US, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the UK participated. Even if the formal machinery collapsed in 1975, the treaty's obligations remain. France is idle. Washington could establish military bases in the

Middle East to protect its oil interests after the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO) was founded in 1954 and 1955. In 1959, Pakistan and the US signed a "Agreement of Co-operation" in addition to four mutual security agreements. According to the New York Times, the two nations would discuss a military alliance if Pakistan "was willing to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment." Pakistani military authorities, led by General Ayub Khan, continuously advocated for weaponry and economic aid funds. He and many American officials believed Pakistan could only defend the area with more weaponry than expected. Officials thought Pakistan perceived Soviet military pressure as significant enough to want to engage with the West. Pakistan's high-ranking authorities apparently thought the Soviet threat was second only to India. Pakistan became "America's most allied ally in Asia" by joining Western military alliances. (Kux , 2001) According to Nirad, "India held the pistol at the head of Pakistan, until, in 1954, the American alliance delivered the country from the nightmare." Pakistan enjoyed the coalition strategy because it provided the perception that it had outperformed India in a major international issue. Since military partnerships with Pakistan were vital, India saw the US "as a friend of Pakistan and opposed to India." Some Indian scholars believe the US' handling of India has caused the country to believe that American backing for Pakistan rejects India's superpower position. US military aid to Pakistan pushed India toward the Soviet Union and angered Pakistan's archrival. Since India was ready to growing relations with Communist nations, other Asian nations were more receptive to Soviet overtures. The Soviet Union supported India's strong line on Kashmir, while Pakistan's cooperation with the US boosted its prospects of pushing India to be more accommodating. Within a decade after independence, the two most significant countries in the area were involved in Cold War politics, where they benefited from superpower assistance.

Members left the group in the early 1970s. Pakistan and France left the group in the early 1970s because they opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam. Pakistan abandoned SEATO in 1973 because it was not helping them fight India. After the Vietnam War concluded in 1975, SEATO's main purpose evaporated. Thus, SEATO folded in 1977.

### Depicts the cold war politics and the Status of Pakistan



Analysis: –Map depicts the picture of the US and Soviet’s Cold-War confrontational alliance: NATO, WARSAW. and depicts the place of Pakistan as an ally of America in its cold war Policy

### Central Treaty Organization:

The US was ready to help any Middle Eastern nation or alliance that had faced Russian intrusions. After the Suez Canal conflict and Western European enmity, the Baghdad Pact was created. It sought to stabilize and influence regional states and fill the power vacuum. (State, December 1976) Turkey and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact for Mutual Defense on February 26, 1955. Pakistan declined to engage without US military strength despite their request. Pakistan, the UK, and Iran signed the deal on September 23, 1955, under pressure from the UK and US. The Baghdad Pact may underpin military and economic help. Then-US Ambassador James Richard visited the Middle East and Pakistan in 1957. He stressed that American policy in the Middle East is not to establish a sphere of influence. Regional conditions necessitated leadership replacement. Secretary of State John C. Dulles told the Senate and House, "Diplomacy, not force, was used to maintain peace. (Rao, 1985). Since Pakistan had influence on the US to conclude the Middle Eastern policy, it asked the US to sign the Baghdad pact. The US was hesitant to join the treaty due to its war ramifications between Israel and the Arab states. (Sattar, 2020) The US helped write the treaty but has not signed it. The US was substantially involved in the alliance's multiple agencies' work. Without formal US participation, other countries were less likely to join. After the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the Baghdad Pact was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) with a modest Eisenhower Doctrine reference.

By 1957, the US had sent Patton tanks, artillery, helicopters, bombers, high-level long-distance radars, frigates, a Ghazi submarine, and help for Pakistan's infrastructure and agriculture. The US also promoted nuclear research facilities. The US was allowed extraterritorial powers to create a secret intelligence facility at Badaber, near Peshawar, under the guise of a "communications Centre." U-2 espionage planes flew over the Soviet Union from this location. From Badaber in Peshawar, the US could monitor the USSR and China. Pakistan paid a hefty price for this cooperation since Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan saw it as an imperialist messenger. It also angered the Soviet Union and China, the two biggest communist nations. Due to worries that the alignment would undermine Pakistan's independence and freedom, it was not widely supported. Finally, the agreement's Kashmir halt was disastrous. A 1958 U.S.-backed coup installed General Ayub Khan. General Agha Yahya Khan succeeded Ayub in 1969. Iran left CENTO after the 1979 revolution overthrew the shah. After realizing the organization no longer helped its security, Pakistan departed that year. Disbanded in 1979, CENTO.

### **Output of Alliances and Cultivation of American Friendship**

Pakistan fought sought US help for four years before 1953. However, it failed. The US prioritized aiding India owing to its strategic location against communist China. Pakistan erred diplomatically. The US never supported it against India on Jammu and Kashmir, Indus water, and Pakistan's economic assets, which India took during partition. No military alliance solved anything.

### **Indian Opposition to Treaties**

Pakistan tried to resolve its concerns with India during the 1958 SEATO summit. India said the Kashmir issue was outside SEATO. While the US stayed out, the Soviet Union supported India. It was decided to resolve the problem at the UN or through bilateral discussions. (Callard, 1959). India saw Pakistan as a danger after 1954. In 1956, Israel fought Egypt, showing that a tiny country with sophisticated armaments could defeat a huge neighbor. Pakistan was not anti-communist, Chou En Lie said in 1963. Pakistan sought to consolidate its position against India. Economic aid from the US was sought by India. The US tried to persuade both nations to overcome their interregional problems to promote stability. (The Dawn, 1963). When the Congress Party organized huge protests, India found a new way to fight Pakistani military backing. Indian embassies worldwide were ordered to oppose Pakistan aid. Indian officials in the US and UN warned that military backing to Pakistan may force India out of the UN and into the Soviet bloc. Pakistan has been warned that it may lose all its Kashmir gains, including canal water and evacuee property.

### **Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971:**

It was not in America's interest to participate in the 1965 Indo-Pak War. Just a localized crisis. President L. B. Johnson cut funds to both nations and handed up crisis management to the Soviet Union.



Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk perceived no risk in letting the Soviet Union make peace. South Asia was less important to the US than Europe, Northeast Asia, or the oil-rich Middle East. Johnson supported UN peacekeeping rather than participating in the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. Johnson endorsed the Soviet-brokered Tashkent deal. India was pleased when the 1965 Indo-Pak War terminated US military aid to Pakistan.

Nixon advised Pakistan to allow East Pakistani dissidents during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict. He also helped India with refugees. Nixon desired Pakistan's honesty. Thus, he deployed the nuclear aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal. 'Enterprise' was meant to prevent India from attacking Pakistan on the Western border, according to Kissinger. But it was also meant to demonstrate China that the US supported its regional partner. The "Enterprise" "sailed" in Indian periodicals and literature for almost two decades, symbolizing American antagonism to India's burgeoning might.

The 1972 Simla Agreement established a regional dispute settlement mechanism. Indeed, India believed the US was against its regional or global dominance throughout the Cold War and the decade afterward. Indian strategists considered Washington untrustworthy and occasionally hostile, whereas Moscow regularly supported India. Due to Indian pressure, the USSR ended Pakistani funding in the late 1960s. Pakistan lost American help during the 1965 and 1971 conflicts. Pakistan received the largest US military funding from 1954 to 1968. Pakistan got \$ 630 million in weapons grants, \$619 million in defense aid, and \$35 million in cash-purchased equipment.

### **Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement,**

US and Pakistan struck a defense deal. The US promised to take mutually agreed-upon actions in the case of attack against any country. The US considered this accord crucial to its national interest. Pakistan needed independence and integrity. President Ayub added, "We needed allies to secure our position." (Khan M. , 1967). America appreciated Pakistan as a faithful ally, which provided facilities important to US interests in the region.

By doing so, Pakistan increased its defensive capabilities and achieved a force balance with India, supported by US and allied superior weaponry and defense technology.

The Iraq revolution prompted Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to promise fresh CENTO reinforcements. Pakistan and the US signed a mutual defense treaty in April 1959. The US agreed to take "appropriate acts" in reaction to hostility by other signatories. The US considered this arrangement crucial to its security. Pakistan prioritized sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Ayub stated, "We needed allies to ensure our position." (Khan, 1967) Pakistan was a stable friend because it provided key infrastructure for US regional interests. According to Article 1 of the treaty, the US considers Pakistan's independence and geographical integrity vital to its national interests and world peace. However, US-Pakistan cooperation goes beyond basic aid. In the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, the US pledged to use military action if necessary. Article 2 requires the US to help Pakistani authorities protect their sovereignty, secure their borders, and build their economy. The US agreed to help Pakistan in an assault, unlike SEATO and CENTO. The US failed to fulfill its responsibilities when Pakistan invoked it in 1965 and 1971. (Sattar, 2020)

### **Implications of Sino-Pakistani relations**

The Pakistan-US relationship entered a period of uncertainty following prosperity. In 1960, global politics shifted. After the U-2 incident in May 1960 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the US and USSR acknowledged competitiveness. Each side desired peace to avert conflict. China threatened world freedom more than the Soviet Union, according to Kennedy. Around this time, the US intended to cut Peshawar facility rent and military funding. Pakistan joined the alliance due of India rivalry. The US and UK handed India \$120 million in military aid during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This Kennedy move undermined ally-aid ties. The new government ignored Pakistan and promised solely military help. US military aid to India altered regional power. Pakistan felt US military help to India would target them, not China. The US urged Pakistan not to exploit India's China anxieties and

promised to assist resolve the Kashmir conflict. Kashmir peace talks stopped. After meeting with China and the USSR, Ayub Khan examined Pakistan-US relations. The US' shortsightedness made Pakistan improve relations with China. Pakistan and China signed a boundary agreement March 2, 1963. The US disliked Pakistan's new attitude because it hindered its China control. The US cut Pakistan \$4.3 million funding. During their 1965 conflict, the US embargoed Pakistan and India. Pakistan suffered more than India, which possessed Soviet weaponry. Pakistan gets Chinese aid. Policy Change in America Post-65 War US neglect of Pakistan. The US's turnaround has several factors. First and foremost, American decision-makers thought the Indo-Pak conflict was destroying regional harmony and squandering military resources. Second, two superpowers reconciled. US nuclear disarmament discussions continued as anti-Soviet enthusiasm waned. US and Pakistan have distinct political and strategic goals. After ceasing military aid to Pakistan in 1967, the US spied inside. Spies flew over the USSR from Peshawar. Pakistan informed the US in 1968 that its Peshawar monitoring site would close ten years later.

Pakistan allied with China as the US substantially increased its military and economic aid to India during Sino-Indo War, signifying a new era in their bilateral ties and shared goals. In the 1960s, China supplied Pakistan with weaponry as a "low-cost secondary deterrent to India," expanding its arms industry and nuclear weapons delivery systems. Pakistan got Shaheen-class short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan's air force and navy use cutting-edge Chinese weaponry. Chinese interceptors, advanced training aircraft, and AEWCR are in Pakistan's Air Force. Pakistan and China build the JF-17 Thunder. Light attack aircraft like the K-8 Karakorum were coproduced. The U.S. wanted a long-term, stable strategic partnership with Pakistan. After the U.S. abandoned them in the 1965 Second Kashmir War, Pakistani authorities questioned the defense pacts. This attitude was "unfair and unethical," limiting US collaboration. The US sanctioned Pakistan during the 1965 War despite Muslim backing. To maintain Indian domination over Pakistan, the USSR gave India military and economic help while cutting Pakistan's. Pakistan's civilian and military leaders realized they needed American help but wouldn't rely only on Western nations. After evaluating this realistic assessment, President Ayub opted to stay in the U.S.-led alliance and retain excellent ties with other major nations.

Moscow backed India against Pakistan and raised tensions over Pushtoonistan, which had Pakistan and Afghanistan on its western flank. This tactic benefited Moscow from Pakistan-US tensions. Pakistan had internal strife. In 1969, Army leader General Yahya Khan proclaimed martial law after Ayub's retirement. Foreign Minister and Pakistan People's Party founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over after Bangladesh declared independence in December 1971. Pakistan-US relations declined after East Pakistan was lost because the US recognized India as a regional force. Despite the US' support for South Asian stability, India felt Washington would not meddle to provide Pakistan and India military parity.

## **Conclusion**

American action in the area eclipsed Pakistan's security concerns due to its need on Pakistan to fight communist threats. The US received several advantages, including a Pakistani air base for missions into Soviet and Chinese territory. Pakistan did not gain crucial foreign policy influence. Thus, the Kashmir issue has continued to divide Pakistan and India. Pakistan mistook its pro-American alliance against communism for hope that the US would help resolve the Kashmir issue. Pakistan strengthened connections with China, despite American guarantees, without mentioning India's warnings. Pakistan gained a critical buddy who was hostile to India with this action. In an increasingly adversarial environment, Pakistan and China's 1963 border accord shows different policy approaches. Diplomacy and high-level discussions between governments were needed to form geostrategic alliances for political goals

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